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I. INTRODUCTION
Desperate to end a lengthy cycle of chronic pain, seventy-nine-year-old
Richard Smith decided to try the prescription medication Neurontin after
multiple doctors recommended he use the drug "off-label" (in a way not
approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA)).' Two months
later, Smith committed suicide. 2 His widow blames the Neurontin and its
manufacturer, Pfizer Inc., for promoting the drug for the treatment of
neuropathic pain, an off-label use. She claims the medication changed his
personality and led to his uncharacteristic decision to shoot himself.3
Neurontin had not been approved by the FDA for neuropathic pain. But
patent law frequently provides monopoly protection for pharmaceuticals that
have not been approved by the FDA.4 However, a new and alarming trend has
developed where patent law undermines the strength of patents for FDA-
approved drugs for various reasons, including lack of utility.5 Thus, patent law
appears to be operating contrary to public health and safety in its protection of
pharmaceutical inventions.
One recent federal district court decision provides an example of
unnecessary, expensive litigation over the patent of an FDA-approved drug. In
Eli Lilly v. Actatis Eli.Zabeth LLC, recently overturned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit),6 the U.S. District Court of
New Jersey invalidated a patent for an FDA-approved drug for lack of data
showing the utility of the drug at the time the patent was filed.7 Although the
drug is currently approved and marketed for the use cited in the patent, the
court found that the plaintiff had not adequately proven the usefulness of the
drug when the patent was filed.8 The district court relied on precedent from the
Federal Circuit, which had also invalidated a patent on the grounds of lack of
utility in spite of FDA approval for the patented use.9 Overturning the lower
court's decision, the Federal Circuit distinguished between the precedent and
the new case, arguing the precedent was an example where utility was not
1 Smith v. Pfizer Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 735, 738-39 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
2 Id
3 Id
4 In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
s See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348-50 (D.N.J.
2010), afd in part, r'evd in part ly Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011
WL 3235718 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011).
6 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718 (Fed. Cir. July
29, 2011).
7 Id at *36.
8 Id.
9 In r '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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adequately demonstrated in the patent. 0 The Federal Circuit sidestepped the
key common factor, however: both cases involved challenges to patents
covering an FDA-approved use of an FDA-approved drug.
These decisions threaten future research and development of pharmaceutical
drugs. A drug manufacturer is not required to seek FDA approval in order to
acquire patent protection of a drug." Rather, patent protection establishes a
monopoly on which drug manufacturers rely while they develop a new drug and
conduct the research necessary to acquire FDA approval.12
Once a manufacturer acquires FDA approval for a certain indication, it
frequently seeks to exploit that approval for the duration of the patent term
through off-label marketing.'3 Off-label marketing is illegal due to the safety
risks involved with using drugs for an untested or unproven use.14 Such
marketing is a common technique pharmaceutical companies employ to
maximize profits during their patent terms. 5 In recent years, federal officials
have focused intensive efforts on reducing off-label marketing of
pharmaceuticals.16 These efforts could potentially be bolstered by stronger
patent protection of FDA-approved uses of drugs, but have instead been
undermined by decisions invalidating patents for FDA-approved drugs.
In light of the prevalence of off-label marketing and the recent decisions
creating disincentives for FDA approval, patent law needs reform in the area of
pharmaceuticals. Specifically, patent law needs some mechanism to protect the
rights of drug manufacturers that have invested in an FDA-approved drug.
Trademark law offers one potential mechanism: the incontestability doctrine,
which provides "conclusive evidence of the validity of the mark." 7 For
pharmaceutical products that have been proven safe and effective enough to
achieve FDA approval for the use cited in the patent, this Note argues that an
incontestable patent could similarly provide evidence of the validity of the
10 Eli Lilly, 2011 WL 3235718, at *8.
11 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063
(Fed. Cit. 1994)).
12 In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
13 Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use - Rethinking the Role ofthe FDA, 358 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1427 (2008).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Muoghalu, No. 07-CR-750, 2010 WL 3184178, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
9, 2010).
15 Stafford, supra note 13, at 1428.
16 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carpenter v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass.
2010) (partially denying Abbott's motion to dismiss claims under the False Claims Act for off-
label marketing); United States v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-598, 2008 WL 6124545 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
10, 2008) (guilty plea entered for distribution of misbranded drugs); Botox Maker Settles Off-Label,
False-Claims Cases for $600 Milon, WEsTLAW J. PHAIUf., Sept. 20, 2010.
'7 BRENT A. OLSON ET AL., CAL. Bus. L. DESKBOOK § 27:26 (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)
(2006)).
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patent, eliminating needless litigation over the usefulness of a drug that clearly
has utility.
To understand why pharmaceutical patents are so susceptible to validity
challenges, Part II examines the legal landscape that created the breeding
ground for the Eli Lilly decision and analyzes both the lower court decision and
the Federal Circuit decision overturning it. Part II subsequently reviews the
exploitation of patent monopolies through off-label uses to explain why
decisions undermining incentives for FDA approval are so dangerous, and how
federal legislation has distorted the incentives in pharmaceutical research. Part
III begins with an economic analysis of pharmaceutical drug protection under
current patent law. Finally, considering all factors, Part III concludes with an
argument for reform to begin correcting the skewed world of pharmaceutical
patent law. Such reform should be done with stronger guidance from the
Federal Circuit and with an incontestability standard to protect the most
valuable patents.
II. BACKGROUND
A. NUTS AND BOLTS OF SEEKING PATENT PROTECTION AND THE VALUE OF
FDA APPROVAL
Economic incentives drive decisions to patent new pharmaceutical
compounds, as well as decisions to pursue FDA approval for various potential
uses of a compound.
It is rational economic behavior for a patent holder to seek to
protect its patent: the patent has economic value and represents a
very real barrier to entry that is enforceable by the holder: the
patent holder can sue to stop infringement. Indeed, under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, a pharmaceutical patent-holder can delay
regulatory approval of a generic drug by simply alleging a patent
infringement.
The same can be said as to any company which has spent
millions of dollars to follow the law in securing FDA approval for
a drug or a device.18
The function of patent law is to provide an incentive for innovation in the
form of a limited monopoly.'9 The exchange of monopoly for invention is
18 Michael K. Loucks, Pros and Cons of Off-Label Promotion Investigations and Prosecutions, 61 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 577, 582 (2006).
19 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146 [Vol. 19:143
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commonly described as the quid pro quo of patent law. 20 In the context of
pharmaceuticals, the innovations most valuable to the public good are useful
medications, which have established "the ultimate utility - prevention,
alleviation, or cure of a disease in the human body."21 Patent protection of
FDA-approved drugs is a key driver of innovation in the pharmaceutical and
biotech industries.22
Both patent law and FDA regulations create and enhance the value of a new
pharmaceutical product. Patent law grants a monopoly that can be exploited
once a product has received FDA approval for sale. 23  In spite of this
cooperation, patent protection and FDA approval are surprisingly divergent.24
Patent protection is based on an exclusively scientific inquiry that ignores the
related issue of FDA approval necessary for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to
fully use its patent.25
Recognizing the huge financial investments in clinical research of potentially
useful medications, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) typically
awards drug patents before any usefulness in humans has been ascertained.26
Because most pharmaceutical patents are filed and issued before the product
receives FDA approval, the regulatory status of the product is mostly irrelevant
to the patent prosecution.27 The lengthy, complex, and expensive process to
achieve FDA approval has ultimately become a justification for a lower
standard of utility in pharmaceutical patents, discussed below. 28  A
pharmaceutical manufacturer typically applies for a patent early in the
20 60 AM.JUR. 2D Patents § 135 (2011).
21 In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
22 Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologis Legislation: FDA
Exclusivity as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. Sc. & TECH. L. REv. 93, 93-94 (2010).
23 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Poiy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 345, 355 (2007).
24 Devesh Srivastava, The Food & Drug Administration & Patent Law at a Crossmads: The Lising of
Poymorph Patents as a Barnier to Generic Drug Ent, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 339, 339 (2004) (citing
Comments of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, submitted to FDA Docket No. 2002N-0417,
Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug (last updated Dec. 30, 2002) at 15).
25 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348-50 (D.N.J. 2010), af'd in
part, rev'd in part, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718
(Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011).
26 See In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (stating that nothing in the patent
statue requires "an applicant to prove that compounds or other materials which he is claiming,
and which he has stated are useful for 'pharmaceutical applications,' are safe, effective, and
reliable for use with humans").
27 Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industy, 19
ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 371 (2010).
28 See, e.g., In re Malachowski, 530 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (finding utility based on animal
studies without evidence of efficacy in humans); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp.
2d 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding utility where only partial aspects of the invention were useful).
2011] 147
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development of a new product, before any testing in humans has been
conducted.29 The scientific data used to support such a patent would not be
adequate to support FDA approval of a drug; rather, it could potentially be used
to support a request for permission to test the drug in human research subjects,
as in the Eli Lilly case.30 Thus, this approach has posed serious problems in
identifying a sufficiently enabled pharmaceutical patent.3 '
Acquiring FDA approval is much more complex and expensive than
securing patent protection. The process, from the initial discovery stage (during
which a patent may be filed) to FDA approval, can cost from $800 million to
$1.7 billion and take as long as fifteen years for one new medication. 32 Because
a patent is filed so early in this process, federal law has been adapted to account
for the lengthy regulatory process. 33 The Hatch-Waxman Act allows for a
patent term extension of up to five years for prescription and over-the-counter
drugs and other products regulated by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. 34
The process for FDA approval begins with in vitro (performed in a test tube
or controlled environment rather than on a live object) and animal research,
which may lead to a drug manufacturer filing an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND) with the FDA.3s The IND enables transport of drugs (and
other products that have not achieved regulatory approval) across state lines. 36
The FDA requires that an IND include animal research, manufacturing details,
and proposed human subjects research plans.37 After thirty days, barring an
29 Eric E. Williams, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industgy Prescrption for Post-Grant Opposition
and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 354, 363 (2008); see also Dickey et al., supra note
27, at 371.
30 El Lilly, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
31 See Kaye Scholer, Section 101: Redefining Patentable Subject Matter and Utiky and the Impact on
Pharmaceuticaland Biotech Patents, 1017 PLI/PAT 59, 66-67 (2010) (stating that patent filing early in
the research process "has led to a body of case law delineating the boundary between the unduly
speculative and therefore unpatentable, and that which is of sufficiently promising utility to be
worthy of patent rights.").
32 Williams, supra note 29, at 363, 373 (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Robert W. Hansen & Henry
G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcoN.
151 (2003); Rick Mullin, Drug Development Costs About $1.7 Bilon, 81 CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEws 8,
available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/topstory/8150/8150notw5.html).
33 STEVEN A. BECKER, PAT. APPLICATIONs HANDBOOK § 5:8 (2010).
3 Id.
35 Development &Approval Process (Drugs), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
36 InvestigationalNew Drug Appcation, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Dev
elopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/Invest
igationalNewDruglNDApplication/default.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
37 Id.
148 [Vol. 19:143
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objection from the FDA, the drug manufacturer can begin clinical research in
human subjects.38
The clinical research process involves four phases, each designed to gather
specific types of data.39  Phase I research examines the "safety, dosage
tolerance, and other pharmacokinetic properties of the drug" and identifies side
effects; Phase II research is conducted in "a limited patient population to gather
information about efficacy, optimal dosage levels, adverse effects, and safety
risks"; and "Phase III trials test the efficacy and safety of the drug in an
expanded patient population at geographically dispersed trial sites."" The
results of the Phase 1-111 research are presented to the FDA in a New Drug
Application (NDA), which should "tell the drug's whole story" and prove that
the efficacy and safety outweigh any of the risks.41 Phase IV research is
conducted post-approval. 42
Statistically, few pharmaceutical compounds achieve the high bar of FDA
approval.43 The high failure rate of pharmaceutical inventions-only twenty of
about 5,000 potential compounds examined are seriously considered for testing
in humans, and of those compounds, only one in five receives FDA approval-
places a significant burden on those drugs that do reach the market to recoup
huge research and development costs.44 These factors create an intense desire
among major drug developers to have strong intellectual property protection
for those drugs that are marketable.45  The Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), a lobbying group for the biotechnology industry, has stated
that protection of intellectual property is the primary factor driving
advancement and economic development of the industry.46 "Maximizing the
38 Id.
39 Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registradon Apartheid: Taming Data Exusidly and
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM.J.L. & MED. 303 (2008).
40 Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 404 (5th Cir. 2001).
41 New Drug Application, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowD
rugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
42 Rahul Guha, Jian Li & Andrea Scott, The Economics of Commercial Success in Pharmaceutical Patent
Litzgation, LANDSLIDE, May-June 2009, at 8, 10 (citing Ernst R. Berndt, The U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry: Iby Major Growth in Times of Cost Containment?, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 100, 109 (2001)),
available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/magazine/LandslideMay09_Guha-Li-Scott.pdf.
43 Gregory J. Glover, Pharm. Research and Mfr. of Am., Competition in the Pharmaceutical
Marketplace, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of justice-
Antitrust Division, 3 (Mar. 19, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/02
0319gregoryjglover.pdf .
44 Id
45 See Bruce Lehman, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Patent System, 7 (2003), http://www.eart
h.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/lehman.pdf ("The pharmaceutical industry is one of three
technology-based industries in which the patent virtually equals the product.").
46 Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescrition for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
2011] 149
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certainty that a research-based manufacturer can obtain, inform, defend and
make full, legitimate use of intellectual property rights is essential to maintaining
the cycle of innovation upon which the industry and public rely."47
Protection of the intellectual property rights for a new prescription drug, in
which a pharmaceutical company has invested millions or billions of dollars, is
paramount. 48 These rights frequently come into question when a generic
manufacturer seeks entry in the market with a competing generic version before
the patent term has expired.49  The Hatch-Waxman Act, in addition to
providing the patent term extension above, contains provisions designed to
facilitate generic drug development and entry into the market.50
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, pharmaceutical companies had dual
protection of intellectual property in the form of trade secrets and patent
protection.5 A manufacturer providing clinical research data to the FDA could
expect this data to remain a trade secret, so that generic manufacturers could
not access or rely on the research in developing a generic version of the drug,
and would instead need to duplicate the research. 52 However, the Hatch-
Waxman Act changed that, allowing generic manufacturers to seek FDA
approval by conducting studies proving only bioequivalence (same strength and
availability within the body) of the generic to the original drug, a much lower
bar than the rigorous safety and efficacy standards required to achieve initial
FDA approval.53
A generic manufacturer can do this by filing an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).54 In filing an ANDA, a generic manufacturer must prove
that it is not infringing a current patent, and can do so through one of four
ways: Paragraph I-IV certifications.55 A Paragraph I certification states that
there are no patents listed, Paragraph II certification states that the listed
patents have expired, and a Paragraph III certification states that the FDA
should approve of the generic drug after the date the last patent expires.56
INTELL. PROP. L. 318 (2006) (citing Biotechnology Industry Organization, Intellectual Property,
http://www.bio.org/ip (last visited Jan. 10, 2011)).
47 Glover, supra note 43, at 10.
48 Williams, supra note 29, at 363.
49 See id. at 364.
50 IRWIN M. AISENBERG, MODERN PATENT LAW PRECEDENT: DICTIONARY OF KEY TERMS
AND CONCEPTS, at H90 (8th ed. 2010).
51 Baker, supra note 39, at 305.
52 Id
53 Id. at 305-06.
54 Abbreated New DrugAppcaion (ANDA): Geneics, FCA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Devel
opmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/Abbrevi
atedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/default.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
ss Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2006).
56 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III).
150 [Vol. 19:143
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Paragraph IV certification, which is most relevant to this Note, means the
generic manufacturer is claiming the patent is either not infringed or is invalid.57
A generic manufacturer that files an ANDA and claims the drug patent is
invalid is subject to a thirty-month "cooling off' period during which the patent
is litigated.58 The patent holder is given forty-five days to file an infringement
suit and then receives thirty months of guaranteed monopoly, unless the patent
holder loses a final appeal before thirty months have passed.59
B. PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT UTILITY STANDARD
Patentable subject matter must be novel, have utility, and be non-obvious. 60
In the pharmaceutical context, the threshold for meeting the utility requirement
is relatively low, although the Supreme Court articulated certain restrictions in
Brenner v. ManSon.61 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent for lack
of utility when the patentee argued its invention was a discovery worth further
researching.62 The Brenner Court stated the broad rule that the object of
valuable research is not in and of itself patentable, without proof of its utility.63
"[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion."64 Articulating its reasons for
refusing to grant a patent without proof of utility and therefore enablement, the
Brenner Court stated:
Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the
public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution
and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.
Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this
point-where specific benefit exists in currently available form-
there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to
engross what may prove to be a broad field.65
s1 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A) (vii) (IV).
58 Srivastava, supra note 24, at 339.
59 21 U.S.C. 5 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).
- 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
61 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
62 Id. at 535.
63 Id. at 534-35.
64 Id. at 536.
65 Id. at 534-35.
1512011]
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Although the Brenner Court appeared to set a high bar requiring completion
of research, the standard has been interpreted to be much lower, allowing
patents that do actually function, to some extent, as hunting licenses. 66 The
courts have skewed the standard based on the presumption that a drug
company will not invest in the requisite research and development to bring a
drug to market without first receiving its patent.67 If the court required Phase II
research as evidence of utility, "the associated costs would prevent many
companies from obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions,
thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through research and development,
potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer."68
To accommodate the practicalities of pharmaceutical research, the courts
have developed multiple methods of ascertaining utility. In a decision predating
Brenner, the In re Krimmel court found that evidence of a drug's actions in
animals can suffice to prove utility. 69 Overturning the USPTO's decision to
deny a patent for lack of utility on the grounds that the patent applicant had
failed to prove the pharmaceutical's efficacy in humans, the Krimmel court held
that a patentee asserting utility of a novel pharmaceutical compound based on
support from animal testing meets the utility requirement under patent law.70
The court based its holding on the belief that identifying the pharmaceutical
quality of the drug in an animal is a "significant and useful contribution to the
art, even though it may eventually appear that the compound is without value in
the treatment of humans."7 Thus, evidence from animal testing may be used
to support utility of a pharmaceutical patent.
In addition to animal testing, in vitro research of a drug's pharmacology
(how it works) and sound logic asserting why this action will be useful for a
particular human condition may also provide evidence of utility. 72 The Brana
court found that a pharmaceutical patent may prove utility by demonstrating a
reasonable correlation between the pharmacological activity of the product and the
asserted utility in humans, even when the pharmacological activity has not yet
been observed in humans.73
The USPTO now instructs examiners that any "reasonable correlation"
between "pharmacological or other biological activity of a compound" and the
66 See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that the stage at which
pharmaceutical inventing becomes useful and thus patentable is well before the pharmaceutical
may be administered to humans).
67 See, e.g., id.
68 Id.
69 In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568.
73 Id
152 [Vol. 19:143
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asserted utility will suffice to establish utility, describing clinical testing in
humans as an "unnecessary burden" that patent examiners should not impose
in the context of pharmaceutical patents.74 Thus, the current standard is that
evidence of pharmacological activity in vitro or in animals will "almost
invariably" prove utility so long as a reasonable correlation exists between the
evidence and the drug's asserted utility.75 The Federal Circuit has even left
open the possibility that utility may be proven through analytical reasoning
alone.76
C. ELI LTLLY V. ACIA VIS AND ITS PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENT
Contrary to the approach recognizing the economic value of a patent and
the million-dollar investment in securing FDA approval for a medication, the
district court decision Eli Illy and Co. v. Actatis Ei.abeth LLC 7 invalidated the
patent for an FDA-approved drug on the grounds the patent lacked utility.78
Plaintiff Eli Lilly, alleging infringement by generic drug manufacturer Actavis,
filed for a patent in 1995, when plans for clinical testing in human subjects had
been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) charged with reviewing
the testing, but not yet conducted.79 The USPTO issued the patent in 1997.80
By that time, Eli Lilly had acquired substantial evidence through the clinical
trials of the efficacy of tomoxetine for the treatment of ADHD in children, the
indication identified in the patent.81 The FDA approved tomoxetine for the
patented use in 2002.82 Invalidating the patent, Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh
pointed to the lack of test data at the time of filing, combined with a lack of
evidence that a person having ordinary skills in the art "would have recognized
the method of treatment's utility in view of the specification and prior art."83
Judge Cavanaugh made this decision in spite of the fact that the patentee
had received IRB approval to conduct research in human subjects, because
none of this research had been conducted at the time of filing the patent. At
74 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
( 2107.03 (8th ed., last rev. July 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-e8
r6_2100.pdf [hereinafter USPTO MANUAL].
7s Id.
76 In r '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
77 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348-50 (DNJ 2010), afd in
part, rev'd in part Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718
(Fed. Cit. July 29, 2011).
78 Id at 390.
7 Id at 378.
8 Id. at 368.
81 Id. at 378-79.
82 Id. at 379.
83 Id. at 389.
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the time of the suit for infringement, the research had proven the efficacy of the
drug for the indication asserted in the patent. However, Cavanaugh stated that
utility should have been proven at the time of filing.84 In response, the plaintiff
argued that IRB approval to conduct the research provided sufficient evidence
of utility at the time of filing.85 According to the USPTO guidelines, approval
to conduct research in human subjects is not only beyond minimum utility
requirements, but should also create a presumption by the examiner reviewing
the patent "that the applicant has established that the subject matter of that trial
is reasonably predictive of having the asserted therapeutic utility."8 6
Rather than weighing the insight of the IRB charged with determining the
merit of the proposed clinical research to test the efficacy of the drug,
Cavanaugh stated the IRB lacked any members skilled in the art and argued
their approval meant nothing with regard to the utility of the drug.87
Cavanaugh disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that strict federal regulations
governing human subjects research prove that IRB approval requires some
showing of a drug's utility.88 "In arriving at its conclusion, the Court cannot
agree with Plaintiff that the relevant regulations require that efficacy be shown
prior to clinical trial approval."89
Contrary to Cavanaugh's statements, patent examiners are instructed that
approval to conduct clinical research trials in human subjects is a strong
indicator of utility, one that examiners should be "extremely hesitant to
challenge."90
Before a drug can enter human clinical trials, the sponsor, often
the applicant, must provide a convincing rationale to those
e.pecially skilled in the art (e.g. the Food and Drug Administration)
that the investigation may be successful. Such a rationale would
provide a basis for the sponsor's expectation that the
investigation may be successful. In order to determine a protocol
for phase I testing, the first phase of clinical investigation, some
8 Id. at 385 ("[Tmhe enablement/utility case law instructs that patent applicants must
demonstrate utility (as well as other enablement-related requirements) at the time of filing the
patent application." (citation omitted)).
5 Id
86 USPTO MANUAL, supra note 74, § 2107.03(IV).
87 E# Illy, 731 F. Supp. 2d, at 388.
88 Id
8 Id. at 389.
90 USPTO MANUAL, supra note 74, § 2107.03(V).
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credible rationale of how the drug might be effective or could be
effective would be necessary.9'
The ultimate irony, of course, is that Actavis, the company alleging that Eli
Lilly's patent was invalid due to lack of utility, sought to profit from the
usefulness of Lilly's patented drug. This irony may have been lost on
Cavanaugh, but other courts have noted that an infringement case asserting lack
of utility as a defense is fundamentally flawed. "People rarely, if ever,
appropriate useless inventions." 92
Cavanaugh's decision relied on two major Federal Circuit decisions as
precedent.93 First, he referred to statements made by the Federal Circuit in
Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., articulating a view similar to Brenner with
regard to the enablement requirement:
If mere plausibility were the test for enablement under section
112, applicants could obtain patent rights to "inventions"
consisting of little more than respectable guesses as to the
likelihood of their success. When one of the guesses later
prove[s] true, the "inventor" would be rewarded the spoils
instead of the party who demonstrated that the method actually
worked. 94
Second, Cavanaugh relied on In re '318 Patent Infringement Litigation,
another example where a patent was invalidated in the context of an
infringement suit due to lack of enablement at the time of filing.95 In that case,
the inventor combined multiple studies from prior art to conclude that the drug
galantamine could be used as a treatment for Alzheimer's disease.96 The prior
art included animal testing of the drug's effects on short-term memory loss. 97
The USPTO originally rejected the patent for obviousness in light of the fact
that the patent relied entirely on prior art to show the utility of the drug.98
Ultimately, the patentee convinced the USPTO that the patent was not obvious,
91 Id.
92 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
93 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 348-50 (DNJ 2010), afd in
part, rv'd in part Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718
(Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (citing In m '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cit.
2009) and Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cit. 2005)).
94 Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
9s In re '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
96 Id. at 1321.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1322.
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and the patent issued in 1987.99 Galantamine was approved by the FDA to
treat Alzheimer's disease in 2001.1oo
In 2005, multiple generic drug manufacturers infringed the patent and
defended their infringement by claiming the patent was invalid.'0 Remarkably,
the plaintiffs were forced to defend the patent on claims that the patent was both
obvious and not enabled due to lack of utility.102 The Federal Circuit, in finding
that the patent lacked utility at the time of filing, relied on the statements the
patentee made to prove non-obviousness, including multiple comments
explaining that the prior art did not indicate that the drug would be useful for
Alzheimer's disease.103  Clearly, being required to prove both the non-
obviousness and utility of an invention relying entirely on prior art put the
plaintiffs in a nearly untenable position.
However, the court appeared to have no problem relying on the non-
obviousness defense to impeach the claim of utility.104 Instead, the Federal
Circuit distinguished the case from Krimmel by articulating the differences in the
types of animal testing that had been performed prior to the filing for their
respective patents and referring to the Brenner standard that a patent is not a
hunting license. 05 The court made this ruling in spite of the drug's ultimate
success and use for the indication specified in the patent.0 6
The court claimed that the animal testing was not sufficiently related to
Alzheimer's, as it did not involve "the use of galantamine to treat Alzheimer's-
like conditions," but instead tested the drug's effects on drug-induced memory
loss. 0 7  The court denied the plaintiffs argument that utility had been
established by analytical reasoning (the basic logic the patentee used to conclude
galantamine would be useful for Alzheimer's disease). 0  However, the court
left open the possibility that analytical reasoning could be adequate support for
utility, but not in In re '318 due to the lack of "insights" in the specification that
the plaintiffs argued provided the analytical reasoning.0 9
Overturning the district court's finding that Eli Lilly's patent was invalid for
lack of utility, the Federal Circuit stated the Eli Lilly case was distinguishable
from the precedent on which Cavanaugh relied. The Federal Circuit
9o Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1323.
102 Id
103 Id at 1325.
104 Id. at 1325-27.
105 Id. at 1324-25 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966)).
106 Id. at 1328 (GajarsaJ., dissenting).
107 Id. at 1325.
10 Id. at 1326.
109 Id.
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distinguished Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. on the basis that Rasmusson
involved a patent interference case, "where evidence of actual reduction to
practice was required to establish a priority date..."" 0 In other words, the
standard at issue in Rasmusson simply did not parallel the question in Eliilly.
In distinguishing In re '318, the Federal Circuit left open the possibility that
many potential infringers may still rely on that case to challenge patents. The
court stated that in In re '318, because animal tests were not completed at the
time the patent was issued, the patentee had failed to show the requisite
correlation between the drug's activity and its purported therapeutic use.111 In
Eli illy, however, the Federal Circuit noted that "the norepinephrine
relationship was known, safety for antidepressant activity had been established,
the specification contained a full description of the utility, experimentation had
been obtained before the patent was granted, and the examiner had not
requested additional information."1 2 Because the results of human subjects
research were available soon after the patent was filed and before it was issued,
Eli Lilly had provided sufficient evidence of utility.113 Much of the information
available, particularly the drug's norepinephrine action and safety, had been
gathered through prior research into a different potential use.
D. EXPLOITATION THROUGH OFF-LABEL MARKETING
Given that FDA approval is required for pharmaceutical products to be sold,
invalidating the patents for FDA-approved products does not, alone, entirely
destroy the incentives for FDA approval. However, pharmaceutical companies
frequently circumvent FDA approval of certain medications through off-label
marketing." 4 Off-label marketing involves representations by pharmaceutical
manufacturers that a product may be prescribed for uses for which it has not
received FDA approval.1 5 Such marketing eliminates the burden of clinical
research required to acquire FDA approval for a new indication.116 Federal
110 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718, at *8 (Fed. Cir. July
29, 2011).
ill Id
112 Id
113 Id
114 JOHN P. GRIFFIN, THE TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 598 (2009).
"s United States v. Muoghalu, No. 07-CR-750, 2010 WL 3184178, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
116 Edward P. Lansdale, Used As Directed? How Prosecutors Are Expanding the False Claims Act to
Polce Pharmaceutical Off-label Marketing, 41 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 159, 163-64 (2006) (stating "[a]s
noted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, '[a] physician may
prescribe an approved drug for any medical condition, irrespective of whether FDA has
determined that the drug is safe and effective with respect to that illness.' ").
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investigators and the FDA have recently focused on prosecuting pharmaceutical
companies engaged in off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals." 7
In a recent report, eight of the top ten False Claims Act settlements in the
fiscal year of 2010 were shown to be related to off-label marketing of
pharmaceuticals." 8 Major settlements between the United States Department
of Justice (DOJ) and pharmaceutical companies for alleged marketing of
unapproved uses of their products have involved pharmaceutical giants such as
Pfizer, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Allergan, and AstraZeneca (among
others)." 9 Eli Lilly and Company recently paid out $1.415 billion for its
marketing of a drug approved for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,
Zyprexa.120 The company illegally marketed the drug for treatment of sleep
disorders and dementia, according to the DOJ.121 The settlement was described
at the time as "the largest amount paid by a single defendant in the history of
the" DOJ.122
The FDA has cited two primary goals of regulating off-label marketing: "(1)
ensuring that physicians receive accurate and unbiased information so that they
may make informed prescription choices; and (2) providing manufacturers with
ample incentive to get previously unapproved uses 'on label' by testing them
and submitting them to the FDA for approval."123 Off-label use of a drug may
be desirable in cases where a certain class of drug has been shown to have
positive effects on a related or milder indications, or where a drug is prescribed
for a population in which it has not been approved for use (such as children) or
for a condition sharing symptoms with the condition for which a drug is
approved.124
Recently, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer paid a huge settlement for claims
related to off-label marketing of its anti-epileptic drug Neurontin
"o See, e.g., United States ex rel. Carpenter v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass.
2010) (partially denying Abbot's motion to dismiss claims under the False Claims Act for off-label
marketing); United States v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-598, 2008 WL 6124545 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10,
2008) (guilty plea entered for distribution of misbranded drugs).
"a False Claims Act Update & Alert, FALSE CLAIMS ACT LEGAL CENTER, http://www.taforg/
whisde295.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
119 See Erica Teichert, Big Pharma Behaving Bad#.:A Timeine ofSettlements, FIERCE PHARMA, Oct. 5,
2010, http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/big-pharma-behaving-badly-timeline-settle
ments.
120 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company ER Lil to Pay Record $1.415
Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/20
09/jan/lillyrelease.pdf.
121 Id.
122 Id.
12 Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 379.
124 Stafford, supra note 13, at 1427.
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(gabapentin),125 which Pfizer and its predecessors marketed off-label for
neuropathic and other types of chronic pain.126 Pfizer acquired a patent for
multiple off-label uses (one patent, the '479 patent, covers "neurogenerative
diseases," defining these as Alzheimer's, Huntington's, Parkinson's diseases,
stroke and ALS).127 Pfizer's assignee then used the '479 patent to prevent
another drug manufacturer from manufacturing and marketing the drug for its
FDA-approved use as adjunctive therapy for seizures.128 The crevasse between
pharmaceutical patent issuance and FDA approval is wide, but Pfizer, according
to Thomas Greene, never intended to make the leap in its patented uses of
Neurontin, choosing instead to maximize profits through off-label marketing.129
Pfizer is just one example. Multiple major pharmaceutical companies have
recently paid large sums in settlements for their off-label marketing of
medications. 130 Because there is no mandatory correlation between a patented
use and an FDA-approved use, off-label marketing provides ample opportunity
for drug companies to exploit their patents.' 3' A drug company may patent and
market a use (in spite of the fact that off-label marketing is illegal) without ever
125 Pfizer, Medication Guide: Neumnin, FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloa
ds/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM229208.pdf ("NEURONTIN is a prescription medicine used to
treat: Pain from damaged nerves (postherpetic pain) that follows healing of shingles (a painful
rash that comes after a herpes zoster infection) in adults. Partial seizures when taken together
with other medicines in adults and children 3 years of age and older.").
126 Thomas M. Greene, Off-Label Marketing & The False Claims Act (Nov. 17, 2004), http://
www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress5/greene.ppt (stating that Pfizer paid a $430
million settlement for its marketing of the anti-epileptic Neurontin for the following unapproved
indications: Alcohol Detoxification, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, Antidepressant-Induced
Bruxism, Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, OCD, Behavior Problems-Dementia-Related,
Bipolar Disorder, Mania, Borderline Personality Disorder, Brachioradial Pruritus, Central
Nervous System Disorders, Charles Bonnet Syndrome, Ciguatera Poisoning, Cluster Headache,
Cocaine Dependency, Dystonia, Essential Tremor, Failed Back Surgery Syndrome, Glossodynia,
Sensory Deficits, Headache (SUNCT), Migraine Prophylaxis, Multiple Sclerosis Complications,
Myalgias-Taxane Induced, Neuropathic Cancer Pain, Neuropathic Pain Syndromes,
Neuropathy-HIV-Related, Nicotine Withdrawal, Nystagmus, Orthostatic Tremor, Pain-
Postpoliomyelitis Pain, Pain-Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy, Partial Seizures-Monotherapy,
Phantom Limb Syndrome, Restless Legs Syndrome, Social Phobia, Spasticity).
127 Novel Methods for Treating Neurodegenerative Diseases, U.S. Patent No. 5,084,479 (filed
Nov. 23, 1990) (issued Jan 28, 1992).
128 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98-C-4293, 1999 WL 259946 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
129 Greene, supra note 126.
130 See, e.g., Cakfornia Drug Firm Settles Fraud Case, Will Pay Near# $37M, 22 No. 10 ANDREWS
PHARM. LITIG. REP. 4 (Nov. 20, 2006); Seattle Drug Firm Settks Medicare Suit, Will Pay $10.5 Million,
23 No. 5 ANDREWS PHARM. LITIG. REP. 14 (June 21, 2007); Astrageneca Settles "Off-Label" Servquel
Action for $520 Milon, 26 No. 04 WESTLAWJ. PHARM. 1 (May 17, 2010); AriZona Drug Firm Settles
Fraud Suit for $9.8 Millon, 23 No. 5 ANDREWS PHARM. LITIG. REP. 5 (June 21, 2007).
131 Stafford, supra note 13, at 1428.
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bothering with clinical research trials or FDA approval for that use.132 Not only
does this potentially pose a danger to consumers, it also blocks legitimate
research that competitors might actually conduct for alternative uses of a
drug.'33 The '479 patent is an example of using the patent to block legitimate
uses of the pharmaceutical.134
A pharmaceutical patent can protect not only the patented use, but also
other uses of a product. This may occur through the theory of inducement,
which allows for liability even when the generic product is intended to be used
for a purpose other than the patented use.135  Thus, this monopoly on
information poses risks to consumers and challenges to regulators who seek
accurate information for patients.136
E. EFFECTS OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Typical defenses to patent infringement include asserting that all or part of
the patent is invalid.'37 It is not surprising, then, that such an assertion has been
codified in the Hatch-Waxman Act. However, one outcome of the Hatch-
Waxman's procedural provisions has been extensive litigation over patent
infringement. As stated by one author, "[a]n issued patent can easily become
the epicenter of a legal battle between drug manufacturers by virtue of its status
as the most valuable component of the drug development process, because it is
this exclusive property right, and figurative security blanket, which allows its
owner the ability to exclude ... ."138
Such litigation has ultimately led to numerous settlement agreements in
which generic drug makers agree to delay entry into the market. 39 These
agreements cost consumers billions of dollars and undermine the Hatch-
132 Id. at 1427.
133 Id. at 1427-28.
134 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98-C-4293, 1999 WL 259946 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
"3s 94 AM. JUR. 3D PmofofFacts § 179 (2010).
136 Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 347 ("Pharmaceutical firms sell drugs rather than selling
information as such, and they face powerful incentives to cheat in developing and selectively
disclosing information about their products in order to improve sales. Inducing firms to provide
high quality information about the effects of drugs in patients is thus a major challenge for
regulators.").
137 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 892 (2010).
138 Katelyn J. Bernier, Obviating the Obvious? An Appraisal of Pharmaceutical Patents, 10 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 208, 217-18 (2010).
139 Jeff Bliss & Susan Decker, Generic-Drug Delay Fight May be Near Turning Point,'FTC's Leibontit
Says, BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/generic-drug-d
elay-fight-may-be-near-turning-point-FTC-s-leibowitz-says.html.
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Waxman Act's goal of increasing generic options,140 and have in turn spurred
ant-trust actions by the Federal Trade Commission.141 Rather than helping to
identify valid challenges to patents, or expediting the arrival of generic drugs,
the Hatch-Waxman Act has encouraged cooperation between the patentees and
generic manufacturers to delay generic entry until the patent expires.142 This
routine procedure imposes extra costs on the patentee, but fails to benefit the
public with the generic's entry prior to patent expiration. 43 These settlements
can add to the expense of a patent without any countervailing benefit.144
F. INCONTESTABILITY DOCTRINE IN TRADEMARK
A trademark becomes incontestable after five years of trademark registration
and creates a presumption of the validity of the trademark. In other words,
"the registration is conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark
and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark,
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce."l 45 In trademark law, incontestability significantly reduces the
burden of proof on the plaintiff whose trademark is being infringed.146
Incontestability strengthens a trademark and creates additional incentives to
register a trademark.147
140 FTC Chairman Heralds Opposition to 'Pay for Delay' Drug-Making Agreements, 26 No. 7 WESTLAW
J. PHARM. 10, 10 (2010).
141 See Susan Decker, Pay-to-Delay' Dreg-Patent Settlements May Be Illegal, Appeals Court Says,
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-29/-pay-to-delay-drug-
patent-settlements-may-be-illegal-appeals-court-says.html.
142 Jef Bliss & Susan Decker, Ending the Silence of Geneic Drugmakers, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 24, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_27/b418
5020593221.htm.
143 Dickey et al., supra note 27, at 390 (stating that some types of settlements impose costs on
consumers).
144 How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal Government Pay More for Much
Needed Drugs: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Com., Trade, and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 2, 8
(2009) (statement ofJ. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
145 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks & Tradenames § 69 (2010) ("An incontestable trademark thus
cannot be challenged for mere descriptiveness, or on the basis that the mark lacks secondary
meaning. Nonetheless, such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark is subject
to proof of infringement as well as certain other specified defenses or defects.").
146 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006) ("To the extent that the right to use a mark has become
incontestable, . . . the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered
mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce ... on or in connection with
the goods or services specified in [the registration] subject to any conditions or limitations [stated
therein].").
147 See id.; see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1985).
1612011]
19
Craig: Placebo Patents: Creating Stronger Intellectual Property Protecti
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2011
J. INTELL PROP. L
Trademark law offers an exception to incontestability, allowing challenges to
the trademark when it violates the functionality doctrine.18 The functionality
doctrine prevents use of a trademark that has a functional purpose other than
identifying the source of the goods.149  This doctrine helps to separate
trademark and patent law and to ensure that a trademark does not offer a
competitive edge or prevent competitors from using a functional material or
characteristic of the product.1so The policy concerns that prohibit the use of a
trademark that has functional characteristics simply outweigh incontestability.
The concept of an incontestable patent has been suggested in the context of
sweeping patent reform by authors L. James Harris and Regan Fay.15' Their
proposal would track the trademark incontestability doctrine by making any
seventeen-year patent incontestable after five years (the proposal also called for
shorter, seven-year patents that become incontestable after one year).152 Their
arguments in favor of incontestable patents are: that the Constitution directs
Congress to secure a limited monopoly for inventors, and an incontestable patent
reflects that goal; that this security would encourage an entrepreneur to invest in
his invention and "bring it to the marketplace"; and that incontestability would
efficiently eliminate wasteful litigation resources. 53 They also suggest that all
potential infringers or challengers to the patent would have notice of and utilize
the time frame in which they can challenge a patent: the five years prior to it
becoming incontestable.' 54
III. ANALYSIS
A. ECONOMICS AND THE DISINCENTIVE CREATED BY EllI LLY
In examining the broad patent incentive structure, Judge Richard Posner has
identified certain economic problems with patents, which are relevant to any
discussion of reform of pharmaceutical patenting. Namely, that patents "bias
investment toward types of inventive activity that yield patents"; discourage or
prevent similar research; and drive customers to "less efficient substitutes." 55
148 Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
149 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
150 Id. at 164 ("It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by
granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time.").
151 See L. James Harris & Regan Fay, Certain Incontestable Patents Are Warranted, 60 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 27 (1978) (arguing for sweeping patent reform through the establishment of a Validity
Court, a dual patent program offering short- and long-term patents, and incontestability).
152 Id
153 Id. at 30-31.
154 Id
155 RICHARD POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-39 (7th ed. 2007).
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Applying Posner's economic critique of patent law to the pharmaceutical
industry, the concern that patents bias research investments 5 6 is the area in
which both the district court and Federal Circuit Eli Lilly decisions are so
critical. The district court's holding sent the message to pharmaceutical
companies that research supporting a drug patent involves not the clinical
research that leads to FDA approval, but rather the research that yields in vitro
results that meets the utility standard. The problem here is that pharmaceutical
patents are already skewed by the low threshold for utility, and, in a case where
a company was actually conducting research that contributed to the body of
FDA-approved uses of a pharmaceutical product at the time of filing for the
patent, the patent was temporarily invalidated.
The Federal Circuit decision, unfortunately, missed an opportunity to
redirect the incentive structure. By turning its holding on the fact that the
patentee knew a great deal of information about the drug based on previous
research into the drug's potential use for another indication, the court's decision
encourages pharmaceutical manufacturers to invest in research of well-known
drugs. While this research obviously yields useful results in some instances, it
may not always do so. The decision also encourages drug manufacturers to
patent multiple uses of a particular pharmaceutical product once a sufficient
base of knowledge about the drug has been established. In this way, the
holding further encourages off-label marketing.
Clearly, patent law is directing pharmaceutical research away from its safest
end use. From an economic standpoint, this can be problematic generally
because of the forgone research. 57 From a practical standpoint, and the
viewpoint of federal officials attempting to limit off-label marketing of drugs,
this incentive structure paints a bleak picture. The prevalence of off-label
marketing suggests that the incentives for FDA approval are more complex
than the practical need to acquire FDA approval to sell a drug. Because drug
companies know how to circumvent FDA approval, and because they
frequently do so in spite of eventually paying hefty criminal and civil fines for
this action, any decision affecting the incentives for FDA approval has broad
implications.
The fact that patents can "impede competing inventive activity" is
particularly relevant in the context of off-label uses of drugs.158 If the patentee
is not conducting the research into additional potential uses of a drug, it is
highly unlikely that other manufacturers are. Generic manufacturers simply
cannot recover the costs of extensive clinical trials. This means that the critical
156 Id
157 Id. at 38.
158 Id
1632011]
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information a clinical trial could yield in regard to a proposed off-label use may
never be discovered. Not only is this problematic due to the possibility that
some potentially valuable off-label uses may be undiscovered or unused, it is
also a problem because of the excess costs that many consumers may invest
into a purportedly helpful off-label use that has not been properly tested. The
settlement with Novartis included a $1.8 million reimbursement to
Connecticut's Medicaid fund for off-label uses of Neurontin, which Medicaid
does not cover.159 An off-label use without additional research takes the
pharmaceutical company off the hook for claims about efficacy, and that
company can continue to profit from such claims without ever having to face
cold hard facts in the context of clinical research. Without competitors who
can observe and challenge the claims, or conduct the research to find out what
off-label indications a drug is actually useful for, the monopoly granted in a
pharmaceutical patent is not only a monopoly on the market, but a monopoly
on information. Such monopolies have created "patent thickets" in which
information is so limited that the industry suffers from a "tragedy of the anti-
commons," where an abundance of property rights constricts available
information and limit research.160 Universities have begun to use patents as
leverage to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies.161 As a result, many
scholarly articles argue that patent protection is too broad in the pharmaceutical
industry.162 However, the problem may also be that the wrong types of patents
are incentivized under current patent law.
B. OVERTURNING ELI LTLLY
The Federal Circuit missed a significant opportunity for reform in
overturning the Eli Lily decision. Rather than simply following the plaintiffs
arguments distinguishing Eli Lily from the precedent on which the lower court
relied, the Federal Circuit should have instead adopted a broad rule that no
patent for an FDA-approved drug should be invalidated for lack of utility,
thereby overturning the problematic In re '318 decision. A rule that FDA-
approved drug patents cannot be invalidated for lack of utility would serve dual
purposes: it would help to prepare for the incontestability standard suggested
159 Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen.'s Office, Attorney General Announces $422.5 Million
Settlement With Novartis For Alleged Off-Label Drug Marketing And Kickbacks (Sept. 30,
2010), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341&Q=466498.
160 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anicommons in
Biomedcal Researh, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/conte
nt/280/5364/698.full.pdf.
161 Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 354-56.
162 See, e.g., id.; Morgan, sfpra note 22.
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below, and it would end the recent trend of absurd patent challenges on utility
grounds for drugs with obvious utility.
The Federal Circuit decision upholding Eli Lilly's patent provided multiple
facts on which to base its finding that the patentee had fulfilled its burden of
proving utility.' 63 The Federal Circuit decision ultimately lists a set of facts for
future litigants to use in challenging or supporting the validity of a patent.
Whether the precise set of facts is matched, or the patentee makes a compelling
argument that its particular facts are analogous, is far less relevant than the end
product the patent protects. If the patent ultimately confers a monopoly onto a
drug that is safe and effective according to FDA standards, this fact ought to be
determinative, rather than the facts used in any precedent to determine validity
of a patent.
As biotechnology advances, the nature of the corresponding patents will
continually evolve. The current utility standard may eventually prove to be too
high of a bar as researchers learn more about the human body, pharmacology,
and medicine. Patent law traditionally leaves open the possibility of change.
The Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos refused to limit patentability to subject
matter that passes the machine or transformation test;164 the Federal Circuit
similarly stated analytical reasoning alone could potentially suffice as proof of
utility.165
These areas do not reflect merely a reticence to create a blanket rule; they
acknowledge that patent law will continually govern what we cannot yet foresee.
With regard to pharmaceutical research and invention, technical rules that are
too strict regarding the data available when a patent is filed may potentially limit
the medications available to the general public and drug companies' willingness
to invest in research. As the industry garners knowledge about the human
body, analytical reasoning alone may eventually be an accurate forecast of the
usefulness of a drug. Patent law needs to be on the cutting edge of this
evolution.
Patents are available to pharmaceutical inventors from a very early stage in
order to encourage continuous investment in the newly discovered product.166
The traditional patent law quid pro quo is different with regard to
pharmaceuticals, and for good reason. A pharmaceutical inventor who believes
he has found the next wonder drug is not likely to abandon this invention upon
receiving a patent; rather, the inventor will strive to quickly seek FDA approval
of the drug. Thus, the understanding is that a patent is issued in exchange for
163 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
16 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221-22 (2010).
165 In re '318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
166 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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additional research in the pharmaceutical industry. This tradeoff is made
possible by the additional incentive to seek FDA approval-to create a safe,
useful, and effective drug.
Obviously, some patents will be issued prior to the acquisition of extensive
data on the medication. These patents, however, should only concern the
courts and Congress when they are not followed to the end of FDA approval.
Abandoning a patent or cutting off research in a subject area with a patent
lacking utility is entirely different than pursuing, in good faith, regulatory
approval of a new invention and filing for a patent while in the process of
seeking that approval.
The Federal Circuit should, when faced with another challenge to the patent
of an FDA-approved drug, narrow litigation over the utility to those patents
that do not offer the benefit of a useful drug. Much debate over the Hatch-
Waxman Act, healthcare, and pharmaceutical legal reform involves the desire to
reduce costs through a variety of mechanisms. The most straightforward
mechanism, however, would be to eliminate frivolous litigation when a patent
has been used to confer a public benefit in the form of a new drug on the
market.
C. CREATING AN INCONTESTABILITY STANDARD IN PATENT LAW
Given the preliminary nature of a pharmaceutical patent and the relatively
low percentage of pharmaceutical patents that actually lead to an FDA-
approved drug, it is obvious that the patent for an FDA-approved drug is the
most precious and valuable patent available in the pharmaceutical industry.
Such patents merit the highest level of protection available in patent law and
should not be susceptible to challenges of validity after the extensive investment
in developing the drug has already occurred. Allowing generic manufacturers to
attack the drug patent after the patentee has made a drug marketable creates
uncertainty about the value of a patent. This will ultimately reduce investment
in research and development of new drugs.
Although there is an obvious interplay between patent protection and FDA
approval, 67 patent law does not take FDA approval into account in assessing
the validity of a drug patent. This oversight ought to be remedied with strong
167 See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 359 ("The FDA is pervasively called upon to track patents in
administering its system of drug approvals, although without ever making substantive judgments
about patent validity and infringement. At the same time, the PTO is called upon to track the
FDA approval process in timing the expiration of patents. The two systems operate in tandem to
confer exclusivity in markets for new products and to determine when that exclusivity should
end, blurring the line between concerns about health and safety and efforts to reward
innovation.").
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patent protection rewarding the efforts of drug manufacturers that acquire FDA
approval of their patented medications. This could begin to close the great
divide between a patentable pharmaceutical and a marketable pharmaceutical.
Looking to other forms of intellectual property protection, trademark law
offers a potential remedy: incontestability. Just as trademark law offers
incentives to register a trademark,168 offering incontestability of a patented drug
or use of a drug once it receives FDA approval could create an incentive-likely
much stronger than that in trademark-for pharmaceutical manufacturers to
seek FDA approval for any patented uses of their inventions. Specifically,
Congress should create an incontestable patent for those patents protecting
FDA-approved uses of a pharmaceutical. Incontestability for FDA-approved
uses would provide an incentive to strengthen the patent for an off-label use,
rather than an incentive to exploit that patent without seeking FDA approval.
Most importantly, an incontestable patent based on FDA approval must
eliminate infringement defenses that challenge the validity of a patent. Because
patent law presumes the validity of a patent and places the burden of proving
invalidity on an infringer,169 an incontestable patent must present conclusive
evidence that the patent is novel (or non-obvious) and fully enabled in order to
offer additional protection. The incontestability need only last as long as the
patent term, but could be used to avoid frivolous defenses to infringement,
such as the lack of utility defense raised in the Eli Lilly case.
Substituting the FDA's judgment for an assessment of the patentability of a
drug is not really as significant of a logical leap as it may initially appear. The
FDA monitors patents as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and FDA approval
ultimately determines the value of the patent at issue.
FDA approval, for obvious reasons, certainly provides extensive evidence
that a new drug is useful. Pharmaceutical inventors must demonstrate safety
and efficacy in order to show the FDA that the drug merits approval. 70 Even
assuming a patent lacked utility at the time of filing, acquiring FDA approval is
a lengthy process, demonstrating significant investment in the product and
likely a good faith belief in the utility of the product at the time the patent was
filed. Given that the patent term is actually tied to the regulatory approval
process, offering an inventor additional time to demonstrate utility after filing
for the patent seems a logical extension.
FDA approval also addresses obviousness. In order to support an IND and
justification for clinical research, a drug maker must present cogent arguments
articulating the scientific need for and value of the new drugs, which may
168 See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1985).
169 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
170 See FDA, New Drug Application, supra note 41.
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include an explanation of why a new drug is potentially superior to currently
marketed drugs.'71  Moreover, obviousness in the pharmaceutical context
carries different policy concerns than it does in other contexts. Viewed broadly
in patent law, obviousness protects against patents for meaningless inventions
lacking any originality. In the pharmaceutical industry, however, a useful drug
that may have been obvious at the time the patent was filed based on the prior
art still requires extensive investment and development in order for consumers
to use it. In other words, obviousness should not outweigh the incentive to
bring a new drug to the market, even if the inventor created the compound
primarily from the prior art. The modified quid pro quo in pharmaceutical
patent law allows for offering a patent for an invention that may be viewed as
legally obvious in exchange for the development of a safe and useful new drug
based on the prior art.
Harris and Fay's proposed patent reform, discussed above, also helps to
address the possible loophole with regard to obviousness by allowing potential
infringers to challenge the patent prior to it becoming incontestable.172
Potential challengers questioning the obviousness of a patent would not be
prevented from raising that challenge; rather, they would need to do so before
the drug receives FDA approval. Given that Hatch-Waxman offers up to a
five-year extension, depending on the amount of time until regulatory approval,
potential patent challengers could have several years before the drug is
approved and the patent becomes incontestable. After approval, potential
infringers would have notice that they could no longer challenge the validity of
the patent.
The largest obstacle to an incontestable patent based on FDA approval is
the Congressional decision to make generic drugs more available through the
Hatch-Waxman Act. However, those aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act that
did make generic entry easier, particularly the creation of the ANDA to reduce
research required for generic drugs, would still be available and relevant. An
incontestable patent would not eliminate generic manufacturers' ability to rely
on the patentee's clinical research information. It would merely demand that
when a generic manufacturer files an ANDA the manufacturer knows it is not
infringing, or presents a stronger challenge to validity than the basic arguments
of inequitable conduct, obviousness, and lack of utility.
Just as trademark law offers an exception to incontestability when a
trademark is functional,173 patent law's incontestability could incorporate certain
limitations that would still enable some challenges to the patent. In the same
171 See IND Content and Fornat, 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2011).
172 Harris & Fay, supra note 151, at 37-38.
173 Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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way that trademark is concerned with a competitive edge under functionality,
the primary policy concern with an incontestable patent is that it could be used
to prevent competitors from research and development in the same arena. For
this reason, in patent law, the exception to incontestability should be for
enablement arguments on the basis of undue experimentation.174 Such an
argument is based on the claim that the alleged infringer's product was not
enabled by the patentee's patent because the infringer had to conduct undue
experimentation in order to create its product. The classic example is Thomas
Edison's light bulb, which technically fell within the claims of an earlier light
bulb patent. 75 The earlier patent called for "fibrous materials" to be used as
the filament for the light bulb. 7 6  Edison, in creating his light bulb,
experimented with a wide array of plant and fibrous materials in order to create
his light bulb, ultimately selecting bamboo as the filament.177 The Court stated
that a holding allowing the original patentee to block off the entire world of
plant and fibrous materials "would be an unwarranted extension of his
monopoly, and operate rather to discourage than to promote invention." 78
These arguments are not entirely addressed by FDA approval, which should
not be used to support an overly broad patent that restricts scientific
advancement. Certainly, the average generic manufacturer presenting a
bioequivalent drug would have difficulty arguing that the patentee had not
enabled the generic drug. However, when a patentee has filed an overly broad
patent, and within the scope of that patent has created a useful new drug, the
scope of the patent should still be susceptible to legal challenge when another
drug manufacturer has created a drug that falls within the scope of the patent
but is not enabled by that patent. Some leeway nieeds to exist for new drug
development to continue.
Allowing the exception for lack of enablement when a patent requires undue
experimentation can balance some concerns about eliminating the utility
argument. Although undue experimentation and utility are components of
enablement, an argument on the basis of utility borders on the absurd when
applied to a useful new drug. However, the undue experimentation argument is
still useful in certain cases where a patentee has simply claimed more than he or
14 See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895); 35 U.S.C.( 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.").
1s Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 471-72.
176 Id
177 Id. at 472-73.
178 Id. at 476.
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she has earned. Those cases where a patent literally cuts off relevant research
that leads to new drugs should be the only patents of concern in the
pharmaceutical industry. These instances can properly be addressed through
undue experimentation.17 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Reforming the pharmaceutical industry is no small task. Many brilliant legal
minds have sought, through a variety of mechanisms, to reduce healthcare costs
while maintaining incentives for innovation. However, innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry comes at high costs to the inventors and to consumers.
Those inventors who create a useful new drug need to recover the cost of their
investments, particularly when a company has invested billions of dollars in
developing a drug from initial research all the way through regulatory approval.
Sometimes, these inventors seek to expand their profits through off-label
marketing of their new drugs. Although federal officials have worked diligently
for years to curb off-label marketing, federal courts have recently begun to
undermine those efforts through patent law. A federal court decision to
invalidate a drug patent for an FDA-approved drug erodes the value of the
patent and eliminates the incentive to seek FDA approval for the patented use.
Patent law need not, however, conflict with federal pharmaceutical
regulatory goals. Reviewing recent court decisions, much needless litigation and
uncertainty with regard to the security of a pharmaceutical patent could be
remedied through new rules acknowledging the role the FDA plays in
pharmaceutical development. The Federal Circuit should create a rule that no
FDA-approved drug patent will be invalidated for lack of utility. Furthermore,
Congress, in an effort to better coordinate the link between patent law and
FDA approval, should create an incontestable patent for those patents covering
FDA-approved drugs and FDA-approved uses.
Despite efforts to promote generic entry into the market, Congress has also
created a more litigious atmosphere in the pharmaceutical industry. Rather than
making access easier, one byproduct of the Hatch-Waxman Act has been
litigation and settlement agreements to keep generics off the market until the
patent expires. These settlement agreements impose dead-weight costs on the
original drug manufacturers and on consumers that ultimately increase the
prices of the patented product.
Acknowledging the realities at work within the system, in particular the
notion that generic drug entry will always be particularly litigious and therefore
79 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(finding biotech patent invalid because it required undue experimentation).
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somewhat more expensive than desirable, adopting simple rules to modify the
issues that can be litigated could significantly reduce needless costs in the
pharmaceutical industry.
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